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SYSTEMATIC INDIGENOUS PEOPLES’ LAND 
DISPOSSESSION: THE BEDOUIN IN ISRAEL 
Morad Elsana0F* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In 2007, the Israeli government unilaterally 
decided to settle the Bedouin land dispute and dispose of 
their land claims.1 The state ordered Bedouin land claims 
to be promptly adjudicated in court.2 The court, 
however, followed a forty-year-old precedent and 
rejected all Bedouin claims.3  
                                                          
 
* Dr. Morad Elsana is a visiting professor at American University.  Dr. 
Elsana holds a Doctor of Juridical Science from the American University, 
Washington College of Law; L.L.M., American University, Washington 
College of Law, 2007; Master of Social Work in Social Advocacy and 
Community Development, from McGill University; and Bachelor's in law, 
Tel Aviv University. Dr. Elsana is the recipient of Fulbright Outreach 
Fellowship (2009-2012; the New Israel Fund Civil Rights Leadership 
fellowship (2006-2007; and the McGill University "Middle East Program 
for Civil Society & Peace Building" fellowship (2000-2002). From 2001-
2009, Dr. Elsana served as a Lawyer and director of Adalah-The Legal 
Center of Arab Minority Rights – the Naqab (Negev) Office. Dr. Elsana has 
also worked as a legal advisor for Genesis Community Advocacy 
Organization in Beer Sheva and as pro bono legal advisor for the Regional 
Council for Unrecognized Villages in the Naqab (Negev). Dr. Elsana’s 
areas of research interest focus on human rights law; indigenous peoples’ 
rights; legal pluralism; comparative law; Colonialism, racial justice and 
the Arab Minority in Israel; and the Arab-Israeli conflict.    
1 See Israeli Government Res. 2491 (Oct. 28, 2007). 
2 See id.  
3 See CA (BS) 7161/06 Suleiman Aluqbi v. St. of Israel, (unpublished 
manuscript) (2012) (Isr.). 
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In reaction, as part of the Bedouin’s attempts to 
defend their rights, they, with several scholars,4 decided 
to challenge the legal status of Bedouin land through 
judicial intervention.5 This could change the longtime 
Alhawashelah precedent from 1984 and convince the 
court to recognize Bedouin land rights.6 Despite their 
intensive research and intellectual efforts, however, the 
test case they chose to take to court was also rejected.7 
While recent research focuses on the judicial 
means that deprive the Bedouin of their lands8, this 
article presents the other part of the picture: a major part 
of the Bedouin lands was not expropriated by recent 
judicial means. Instead, they were legislated through 
laws by the Israeli Knesset and enforced by the 
administrative infrastructure overseen by the executive 
branch of the government through political and 
administrative means.9   
                                                          
 
4 See Morad Elsana, The Role of the Judiciary in Dispossessing 
Indigenous Peoples’ Land: The Bedouin Case in Israel, 33 J. JURIS. 333 
(2017); Oren Yiftachel, Alexander (Sandy) Kedar & Ahmad Amara, Re-
Examining the ‘Dead Negev Doctrine’: Property Rights in the Bedouin-
Arab Space, 14 MISHPAT UMIMSHAL (2012). 
5 See id. 
6 See id. 
7 See CA (BS) 7161/06 Suleiman Aluqbi et. al. v. State of Israel, supra 
note 3; Suleiman Aluqbi v. St. of Israel, (2012). 
8See generally S. JAMES ANAYA, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW (Oxford U. Press ed., 1996); see also Elsana, supra 
note 4; see also Joseph William Singer, Nine-Tenths of the Law: Title, 
Possession & Sacred Obligations, 38 CONN. L. REV. 605 (2006). 
9 See generally Singer, supra note 8.  
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For many indigenous peoples throughout the 
world, the judicial battles to preserve or regain land 
rights generally started after violence from the initial 
dispossession that occurred.10 In the Bedouin’s case, the 
timeline of this experience is somewhat more recent 
when compared to the narratives of the indigenous 
peoples of the Americas or Australia.11 Therefore, 
judicial actions overlap with ongoing administrative 
executive and political legislative acts of land 
dispossession.12 Thus, untangling the specific sources 
and methods of land dispossession becomes essential in 
the ongoing effort to understand the Bedouin peoples’ 
encounter with a version of a settler colonial state.13  
This article argues the indigenous land issue is 
not a classical legal case. Rather, it is an issue with a 
sharp political, ideological and cultural character. 
Therefore, the handling of the issue in court is “unusual” 
in many ways. It poses many non-conventional issues 
and clearly contradicts basic principles of justice. The 
article starts by showing that most Bedouin land rights 
were dispossessed through a colonial methodology that 
combines settlement, occupation, and acquisition of 
indigenous land on multiple levels rather than typical 
                                                          
 
10 See BILL YENNE, INDIAN WARS: THE CAMPAIGN FOR THE AMERICAN 
WEST (2006). 
11See generally LOUIS A. KNAFLA, ABORIGINAL TITLE AND 
INDIGENOUS PEOPLES: CANADA, AUSTRALIA, AND NEW ZEALAND (W. 
Wesley Pue, et al. eds., 2010). 
12 See Singer, supra note 8.  
13 See generally Elsana, supra note 4. 
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judicial decisions.14 The first part of land dispossession 
occurred through settlement and international decisions 
that supported the dispossession.15 The second part 
occurred after the establishment of the “settler state” 
through colonial oriented, administrative and legislative 
actions that ignore indigenous Bedouin land rights.16 
Many of these acts are for the sole benefit and interest of 
the settler population.17 Moreover, these acts laid the 
groundwork for later colonial legal rulings that only 
confirmed previous administrative and legislative 
actions, and continued to ignore indigenous Bedouin 
land rights.18    
 Section two of this article introduces the 
indigenous land dispossession, generally exploring how 
indigenous land was dispossessed in several phases by 
different methods that include administrative, executive, 
and judicial ones.19 Section three introduces essential 
background about the Bedouin, including their 
demographics and land dispute. Then, section four 
describes the process of Bedouin land dispossession on 
the general level as part of the Palestinian land 
                                                          
 
14See generally S. JAMES ANAYA, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW (Oxford U. Press ed., 1996). 
15See id. 
16 See Elsana, supra note 4, at 6. 
17 See id. 
18See generally First Nations Summit, Implementation of 
Jurisprudence Concerning Indigenous Peoples’ Rights: Experiences from 
the Americas - A Canadian Perspective 19-20 (2005), 
http://www.fns.bc.ca/pdf/Implementationof Jurisprudence_IP1005.pdf. 
19 See Singer, supra note 8.  
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dispossession.20 Section five focuses on the specific 
level of land dispossession, describing the explicit 
methods designated solely and especially for Bedouin in 
the Negev.21 This section details the administrative and 
legislative methods for land dispossession, mainly the 
concentration plan and the Goldberg plan.22 On the 
legislative level, this section looks at three acts and 
focuses on the Land Settlement Ordinance  of 1969 as a 
major instrument for Bedouin land dispossession.23 
Finally, section six concludes with a discussion that aims 
to shed light on elements and tactics the state has been 
using to bend the rules (on the judiciary level) in order to 
make sure courts follow the state’s plan.24      
II. THE DISPOSSESSION OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES LAND 
RIGHTS 
The dispossession of indigenous peoples’ land 
rights remains one of the most common human rights 
violations around the world.25 After the discovery of the 
New World, the Europeans started a long process of 
                                                          
 
20 See Elsana, supra note 4, at 9. 
21 See generally Israeli Government Res. 2491 (Oct. 28, 2007). 
22 See generally Ministry Of Construction & Housing, GOLDBERG 
REPORT 31–2 (2009), 
http://www.moch.gov.il/SiteCollectionDocuments/odot/doch_goldberg/Do
ch_Vaada_Shofet_Goldberg.pdf. 
23 See Elsana, supra note 4, at 19. 
24 See generally Elsana, supra note 4. 
25 See Erica-Irene A., Economic and Social Council Final Working 
Paper No. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2001/21, 38 (June 11, 2001), 
http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/demo/RelationshiptoLand_Daes.pdf. 
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conquest, occupation, and colonization of indigenous 
peoples’ lands.26 The newcomers took over the territory 
of indigenous peoples while denying their sovereignty, 
their land rights, their cultural expression, and, on 
several occasions, their very existence.27  
While specifics vary, indigenous peoples around 
the globe fiercely opposed the European invasions and 
resisted the occupation of their lands.28 In many 
instances, they even engaged in wars or armed conflicts 
with the invaders to resist the acquisition and occupation 
of their lands.29 However, the Europeans ultimately took 
over indigenous peoples’ lands and territories through 
military dominance.30 After conquering and occupying 
the lands, colonial powers and the new settlers 
established their new sovereign state’s power over the 
                                                          
 
     26 See ANAYA, supra note 14, at 3. 
27 See First Nations Summit, Implementation of Jurisprudence 
Concerning Indigenous Peoples’ Rights: Experiences from the Americas - 
A Canadian Perspective 19-20 (2005), 
http://www.fns.bc.ca/pdf/Implementationof Jurisprudence_IP1005.pdf; see 
also PETER H. RUSSELL, RECOGNIZING ABORIGINAL TITLE: THE MABO CASE 
AND INDIGENOUS RESISTANCE TO ENGLISH-SETTLER COLONIALISM (2006 U. 
of Toronto Press ed., 2005) (discussing how Aboriginal peoples’ leaders 
and state representatives, such as Edward Woodward, head of the 
Woodward Commission, traveled from Australia to the United States and 
Canada to learn about the recognition of indigenous peoples land rights); 
EPHRAIM YUCHTMAN-YAAR & ZE’EV SHABAT, MAGAMUT BAHEVRAH 
HAYESRAILIT [TRENDS IN ISRAELI SOCIETY] 1218 (2003) (discussing former 
Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir's denial of the existence of a Palestinian 
nation). 
28 See KNAFLA, supra note 11, at 173. 
29 See YENNE, supra note 10, at 7. 
30 See ELSANA, supra note 4, at 7. 
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indigenous territories.31 With their new governmental 
systems—administrative, political, and, eventually, 
judicial—they continued dispossessing the remaining of 
indigenous peoples’ lands.32 Hence, while conquest and 
occupation enabled taking physical possession, the new 
state’s administrative, political, and judicial methods 
were utilized to legitimize their acts of dispossession.33 
At the same time, this ensured that no political or legal 
options were available for indigenous people to defend 
or regain their land rights.34  
The process of dispossession rarely, if ever, 
proceeded in a clear, simple sequence, and depending on 
the size of the territory, the physical conquest often 
overlapped with the establishment of the governmental 
systems that established the Western legal apparatus for 
nullifying the rights of indigenous peoples to their own 
lands in perpetuity.35  While the judicial method of 
dispossession was often the last method utilized by a 
government, it often overlapped in its establishment and 
actions with ongoing administrative policies and 
political or legislative actions that expropriated land 
from indigenous peoples.36  One need to think only of 
                                                          
 
31 See generally, JÉRÉMIE GILBERT, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES’ LAND 
RIGHTS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW: FROM VICTIMS TO ACTORS (2006) 
(discussing methods of land dispossession). 
32 See Singer, supra note 8.  
33 See id. 
34 See id.  
35 See generally ANAYA, supra note 14, at 3.  
36 See id.   
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the history of the United States and the infamous Trail of 
Tears to recognize the pattern of executive and 
legislative actions, overlapping with, in that case, 
somewhat more sympathetic judicial action that 
nevertheless ultimately dispossessed tens of thousands 
of indigenous peoples from their lands.37 
The international community supported the 
invasion and occupation of indigenous peoples of the 
New World.38 Unlike modern international law that 
protects the rights of indigenous peoples, during that 
time, international law supported colonial acts of 
invasion and land dispossession even when they violated 
indigenous peoples’ rights.39  “Europeans” at that time 
denied indigenous peoples in the New World the right of 
sovereignty and facilitated the dispossession of their 
land.40 Old principles of international law and legal 
doctrines, such as the Doctrine of Discovery and terra 
nullius, justified the occupation and the dispossession of 
indigenous peoples’ land.41 Relying on such 
international law principles, colonial powers made 
fictional assumptions regarding indigenous peoples' land 
that severely affected their land rights.42 They did this 
                                                          
 
37 See id. 
38 See id. at 9, 26.  
39 See id. at 6, 15-26. 
40 See id. at 22.  
41See Blake Watson, The Impact of the American Doctrine of 
Discovery on Native Land Rights in Australia, Canada, and New Zealand, 
34 SEATTLE UNIV. LAW REV. 507, 512 (2011). 
42 See id. 
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first, by claiming that indigenous peoples did not legally 
exist (thus their land could be acquired); then, by arguing 
that they were inferior to the colonial powers (thus their 
right to lands could be extinguished).43  In the United 
States, for example, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court 
John Marshall similarly justified the way in which 
colonial powers laid claim to indigenous peoples’ lands 
during the Age of Discovery.44 Australia considered 
Aboriginal land as a vacant land and denied their land 
ownership claims.45 Similarly, Israel considers all 
Bedouin's land as mawat land, which literally means 
“dead land.”46  
Despite this, during the last few decades 
indigenous people have succeeded in bringing their 
issues to the attention of the international community.47 
Moreover, several international organizations, such as 
the International Labor Organization (ILO), have raised 
the issue and called for recognition of indigenous 
                                                          
 
43 See GILBERT, supra note 31; Gilda C. Rodriguez, Wik Peoples v. 
State of Queensland: A Restrained Expansion of Aboriginal Land Rights, 
23 N. C. J. INT. LAW COMMER. REGUL. 711, 722 (1997). 
44 See Watson, supra note 41 at 511. 
45 See Rodriguez, supra note 43 at 722. 
46 See Chanina Porat, Israel’s Policy on the Bedouin Issue and Left-
Wing Alternatives, 1953-1960, 10 Iyyunim BiTekumat Israel 420–476, 457 
(2000) (explaining Bedouin submitted land claims as early as the 1950s. 
They based their land claims on documents proving that they had paid taxes. 
However, the State claimed that no land titles settlement occurred in the 
Negev; therefore, Bedouin did not possess any proof of land ownership. In 
addition, the State claimed that tax documents were lost from the State 
archives). 
47 See generally ANAYA, supra note 14.  
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peoples’ land rights.48 Others have articulated several 
instruments that recognize and protect indigenous 
peoples’ rights.  For example, in 2007, international 
recognition of indigenous peoples’ land rights through 
the United Nations Universal Declaration for the Rights 
of Indigenous Peoples.49  Unfortunately, despite these 
substantial developments, international law continues to 
offer very limited protection for their land rights.50 
On the national level, after the establishment of 
the settlers-state, indigenous peoples began to struggle 
for their land rights through the settler-state system, but 
mainly through local courts.51 But as this article shows, 
their legal struggle was also cut off and doomed to 
failure.  The legislations the settler-state enacted and the 
administrative processes it carried out not only led to the 
dispossession of indigenous lands, but also created the 
platform for legal supremacy and even eliminated any 
chance of indigenous claims in court.52  Furthermore, 
changes settler-states made on the ground, and many 
other factors—not directly related to land conflict—such 
as language competence (difficulties) and a difficult 
                                                          
 
48 See generally GILBERT, supra note 31.  
49 See generally Universal Declaration for the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples, G.A. Res. 61/295 (Oct. 2, 2007), 
https://www.un.org/development/desa/indigenouspeoples/wp-
content/uploads/sites/19/2018/11/UNDRIP_E_web.pdf. 
50 See GILBERT, supra note 31 at 114. 
51 See Elsana, supra note 4 at 336 (explaining although other struggle 
and advocacy options were available more attention was given to the legal 
advocacy).  
52  See id. at 367. 
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economic situation have made their struggle impotent; 
without a real chance of success.53 
However, in the recent decades, many 
indigenous groups around the globe, with no other 
choice, focus on judicial advocacy; sometimes they 
overestimate the power of judges and courts to recognize 
their rights.54  They tend to forget the inherent conflict 
between colonialism and injustice, especially in land 
conflicts.55  They also ignore the historical fact that the 
majority of indigenous peoples’ land was mainly 
dispossessed by non-judicial methods.56  But, most 
importantly, they forget that when they approached 
national courts to protect their rights, and recognize their 
right, national courts—with some exceptions—could not 
provide any protection, in the contrary many times courts 
supported the colonial action and even legitimized 
them.57 
The Bedouin case shows how their land was 
dispossessed and how the Bedouin’s have been trying, 
with no avail, to get their land rights recognized in the 
courts that have been denying their cases time after time. 
This article goes further to show how the state, using 
legislation, and administrative orders was able to 
                                                          
 
53 See id. at 357. 
54 See generally Gilbert, supra note 31. 
55 See id. at 157.  
56 See id.  
57 See generally Elsana, supra note 4 (according to the decisions of J. 
Marshall in the US context and the decision of the Israeli Supreme court in 
Alhawashela case). 
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dispossess about 90% of Bedouin land.58 Moreover, 
these legislative and administrative orders insured the 
Bedouin’s land rights were denied in court.  
III. THE BEDOUIN AND THEIR LAND ISSUE 
A. THE BEDOUIN 
The Bedouin in Israel live in the Negev, the 
southern part of Israel.59  They are part of the Arab-
Palestinian minority in Israel60 that consists of between 
200,000 and 230,000 people.  They constitute about 
3.5% of Israel’s population.61 The Bedouin live in two 
types of settlements: (1) village the state has recognized 
(“townships”) and (2) villages that the state considers 
illegal settlements (“villages” or “unrecognized 
villages”).   62 Approximately two-thirds of the Bedouin 
population in the Negev live in seventeen townships and 
nearly one-third live in thirty-five unrecognized 
                                                          
 
58 See generally Elsana, supra note 4. 
59 See Salman Elbedour et al., Bedouins of the Negev: Ethnicity and 
Ethnic Identity among Bedouin Adolescents in Israel, 2 INT. J. CHILD 
HEALTH HUM. DEV. 177 (2009) (exploring Bedouin identity). 
60 See id.  
61 See Lexicon of Terms: Minorities in Israel, Bedouin, THE KNESSET 
(July 2007), http://www.knesset.gov.il/lexicon/heb/bedouim.htm; Ghazi 
Falah, Israeli State Policy toward Bedouin Sedentarization in the Negev, 18 
J. OF PALESTINE STUDIES 71, 78 (1989). 
62 See Shiri Bass Spector, Environmental and Health Issues Among 
Bedouin in the Negev Unrecognized Villages, KNESSET RESEARCH AND 
INFORMATION CENTER (2011), 
http://www.knesset.gov.il/mmm/data/pdf/m02809.pdf.  
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villages.63 Bedouins who live in unrecognized villages 
are deprived of very basic rights and services, including 
running water, electricity, secure infrastructure, 
education, health services, and social services.64 But 
most importantly, they are not allowed to build any 
houses in these villages.65 Thus, they are subject to harsh 
state acts such as, house demolitions, crop destruction, 
livestock confiscation, and land expropriation,66 all due 
to a  longtime dispute over the land.  
Historically, the Bedouin have lived as a semi-
nomadic people in the Negev for centuries, well before 
the establishment of the State of Israel and some would 
say since the fifth century C.E.67  The Bedouin have 
lived in the Negev from the time immemorial and 
consider themselves natives.68  
Mischaracterizations of their nomadic and semi-
nomadic lifestyle have been used as part of the narrative 
to undermine claims to their historic presence in the 
Negev and to assert a lack of ties to these specific 
lands.69  However, the Bedouin have long-held tribal 
                                                          
 
63 See id. 
64See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, OFF THE MAP, 
http://hrw.org/reports/2008/03/30/map (last visited Mar. 5, 2019).  
65 See id.  
66 See id. 
67 See PENNY MADDRELL & YUNIS GRINAWI, THE BEDOUIN OF THE 
NEGEV 4, LONDON MINORITY RIGHTS GROUP (1990). 
68 See Yiftachel, supra note 4 at 134-36.   
69 See Havatzelet Yahel, Ruth Kark & Seth J. Frantzman, Are the 
Negev Bedouin an Indigenous People?, MIDDLE EAST Q. (2012), 
http://www.meforum.org/3254/negev-bedouin-indigenous (last visited Jan 
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territorial boundaries, defined by intra- and inter-tribal 
agreements of customary tribal law, forged over 
generations and preserved in indigenous documents 
called Sanadat.70 Sanadat describe the Bedouin  land, 
rights, boundaries of different tribes’ lands, size, and the 
owners and many other details related to their land, just 
like any modern title deed.  
B. THE BEDOUIN’S LAND ISSUE 
Since its establishment, the State of Israel has 
been denying Bedouin land rights and continues to 
dispossess their lands in order to drive them out.71  The 
dispossession of Bedouin land72 can be divided into two 
general phases: (1) the occupation of the land, and (2) the 
legalization of the occupation of the land.73  The State 
first occupied the Bedouin’s land, evicted many of them 
and concentrated the remaining groups into a small area 
in the northern Negev called Siyag.74 Then, in the second 
phase, it enacted several laws that further enabled the 
dispossession of Bedouin land through legislative and 
judicial means.75 Courts have supported the 
                                                          
 
9, 2017) (This article shows how some Israeli scholars, who are affiliated 
with the government, present the Bedouins in Israel). 
70 See Elsana supra note 4. 
71 See Havatzelet, supra 69 at 8-9. 
72 See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, OFF THE MAP, supra note 64. 
73 See id.  
74 See id.  
75 See id.  
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dispossession and made sure the interpretation of the law 
maintained the same principles.76  
Like Palestinian lands, Bedouin lands were 
occupied as part of the colonial activity of the Zionist 
settlement movement in Palestine during the British 
Mandate.  These lands were then occupied during the 
war fought in 1947 to 1948, immediately after the U.N. 
vote to establish a Jewish state in Palestine.77 The early 
colonial history of the Bedouin barely even scratches the 
surface of the broader history of European colonialism 
that reshaped the map of the Middle East in the wake of 
World War I and the dissolution of the Ottoman 
Empire.78  
The Negev had been part of the Ottoman Empire 
for centuries, and it fell under British rule (later British 
Mandate) in Palestine from 1917 to 1948.79  The land 
reforms to settle and register land rights (title deeds), 
instituted by the Ottomans and continued by the British 
in Palestine, were not applied to the Bedouin lands in the 
Negev.80  However, in practice, both the Ottomans and 
the British largely accepted the Negev Bedouins’ tribal 
system for establishing land claims, handling land 
disputes between tribes, paying taxes on lands, and 
                                                          
 
76 See id.  
77 See YEHUSHOA PORAT & YAKOVSHAVIT, THE HISTORY OF ERETZ 
YESRAEL: THE BRITISH MANDATE AND THE JEWISH NATIONAL HOME  (1998). 
78 See Ahmad Amara, The Negev Land Question Between Denial and 
Recognition, 42 THE J. OF PALESTINE STUDIES 4, 27, 30-34 (2013).  
79 See id. at 29.  
80 See id. at 30. 
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managing land-related issues.81 Hence, neither the 
Ottoman nor British land registry laws were applied to 
the Negev Bedouin.82 Thus, when the British Mandate 
ended and the State of Israel was established, the 
Bedouin found themselves facing a different settler-
colonial ruler who applied the old rules in new ways that 
did not recognize their indigenous land rights.83 
IV. BEDOUIN LAND DISPOSSESSION ON THE GENERAL 
LEVEL 
The roots of the Bedouin land issue can be traced 
to the history and developments in Palestine and the 
Middle East since the late 18th century.84  Like many 
Palestinian lands, Bedouin lands were occupied as part 
of the Zionist movement in Palestine.85  The first phase 
of their dispossession was done as a part of the entire 
Palestinian land dispossession without specific attention 
to Bedouin land in the Negev.86 While the second phase 
was completed later as part of an explicit project 
designated to specifically dispossess the indigenous 
Bedouins of the Negev.87   
                                                          
 
81 See id. at 31-34.   
82 See id.  
83 See id.  
84 See Elsana supra note 4.  
85 See Falah, supra note 61, at 73. 
86 See Elsana, supra note 4, at 339. 
87 See id. 
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Settlement in Palestine started to be the primary 
goal for the Zionist movement after the decision to 
establish a State for the Jewish people.88  During the late 
19th century, the Zionist movement held its first 
conference where it decided to establish a Jewish state in 
Palestine.  As part of its plan, the Zionist movement 
started a process of settlements in different places in 
Palestine. To facilitate Jewish settlement, the Zionist 
movement focused on land purchase in Palestine.89   
In addition to the above-mentioned reasons, the 
Zionist movement of settlement in Palestine was also 
supported by both practical (the need for land) and 
ideological levels.90  On a practical level, Zionist leaders 
believed that possession of land in Palestine was an 
essential element for the Zionist project’s success, vital 
for the future Jewish state, and important to 
accommodate incoming Jewish immigrants.91  On the 
ideological level, the movement embraced a biblically 
based ideology that claimed that the land in Palestine 
(i.e. the land of Israel) was divinely given to the Jewish 
                                                          
 
88 Practical Zionism - under the leadership of Moshe Lilienblum and 
Yehuda Leib Pinsker - argued that immigration to Israel and settlement 
should begin soon, even before the attainment of a charter for the Land of 
Israel. The proponents of this approach emphasized the need for large-scale 
settlement in Paestine/Eretz Israel that would help establish a national 
home. See WALTER LAQUEUR, A HISTORY OF ZIONISM 103-07 (2003); Oren 
Yiftachel, Ethnocracy: Land and Identity Politics in Israel/Palestine, 
(2006). 
89 See id.  
90 See Elsana, supra note 4 at 340. 
91 See id. 
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people, and thus, Jews must “redeem the land” from non-
Jewish inhabitants.92  Many of the movement’s leaders 
also brought with them a European culture of bias that 
viewed the Arabs, particularly the Bedouin, as 
uncivilized people, and viewed their land as empty land, 
terra nullius in the classical sense.93 
A. INTERNATIONAL INTERVENTION  
As a result of the influx of Jewish migrants from 
Europe to Palestine and the spread of the news about the 
Zionist plan to establish a Jewish state, Palestinians 
demonstrated against the British mandate and 
demanded the restriction of Jewish migration. 
demanding to restrict the Jewish migration.94 These 
“demonstrations” reached their peak in the 1936 Arab 
Revolt.95 The British, who ruled during that time, asked 
for the intervention of the international community and 
forwarded the issue to the League of Nations, who in 
turn, decided to establish a committee, the Peel 
Commission, to search for and suggest a solution for the 
issue.96  After deliberations, the committee came up 
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with the partition plan to divide Palestine into two 
states: an Arab state and a Jewish state.97 During that 
time (1937), Zionist leaders discovered that the 
proposed Jewish state borders excluded the Negev 
region.98  Zionist leaders acknowledged the need to 
expand Jewish settlements into the Negev in order to 
convince the international community to include the 
Bedouin territory in the Negev to the future Jewish 
state.99  
They also came to understand that the rules of 
partition of the land were based mainly on the 
“existence of majority.”100  In places where the majority 
of people were Jews, the committee offered the area to 
the Jewish state, and in areas of Arab majority, the area 
was offered to the Arab state.101  Jewish leaders realized 
that to get the Negev included into the future Jewish 
state, they had to settle it with Jewish settlers.102  
Therefore, over the next two years,103 the Zionist 
movement established eleven small colonies in the 
Negev, each with only a little more than a wall and a 
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watchtower.104 The Zionist movement’s plan worked 
and the 1947 League of Nations Partition Plan for 
Palestine designated the Negev as part of the Jewish 
state.105  
B. THE 1948 WAR AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A NEW 
STATE  
The Partition Plan, however, was just the 
beginning of the conquest phase of the land 
dispossession for the Palestinian land, including the 
Bedouin.  The 1948 war that broke out when the British 
ended the mandate on Palestine and decamped, resulted 
in the conquest of the rest of Negev. The brutality of the 
Jewish paramilitary organizations during the 1948 war, 
and later by the Israeli Army, with their determination to 
expel as many Palestinian Arabs from their homes as 
possible,106 resulted in the eviction of an estimated 
700,000 Palestinians, only an estimated 160,000 
remained.107  When the border of the State of Israel was 
finally established in 1949, the Palestinians who 
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survived the war became citizens of the new Jewish 
State.108  
After the establishment of Israel, despite their 
Israeli citizenship, tens of thousands of Palestinian-
Israelis were forcibly relocated from their original 
villages to other villages; a practice that affected all 
Arabs, but mainly the Bedouins of the Negev.109  Indeed, 
the majority of the remaining 11,000 Bedouins were 
evicted from their land and relocated to a small area in 
the northern Negev called the siyag, “fence” in 
Hebrew.110  
After Israel’s independence, the State placed all 
Palestinians under a military rule from 1949 until 1966 
and forced many Palestinians to live in designated 
areas.111 During this eighteen year period, the State 
worked on several levels to change the historical reality 
and geography of the region. The State destroyed many 
villages that were abandoned by the Palestinians and 
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prevented inhabitants from returning to their homes.112 
The State built Jewish settlements in place of the 
destroyed Palestinian villages, and changed the 
geographical zoning of the land by planting forests or 
building roads to make reestablishment of the Palestinian 
villages impossible.113 Israel took these actions despite 
obligations under international law114 and demands from 
the international community that Israel allow refugees to 
return to their homes.115  
C. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE STATE 
On the political level, land control became an 
important component of the State’s settlement, 
development, and defense policies.116 The first leaders of 
the State, such as David Ben-Gurion, Avraham Granott, 
and Moshe Dayan, believed that State control of land 
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was an essential for the existence of Israel.117 Acting on 
this belief, that a Jewish presence on as much land as 
possible within the State was essential for Israel’s future 
security, Israel drafted plans for land control, which 
focused on demographic engineering and population 
distribution in the State. The overall goal of these plans 
was to establish a Jewish presence in most areas of the 
country, a goal that relied heavily on the State’s control 
of land.118 As a result, these policies were implemented, 
without exception, from the northern border of Israel all 
the way to the southern tip of the Negev.119  
On the legislative level, Israeli leaders strove to 
ensure the laws of the State were in line with the goals of 
the land control policies.120 When the State adopted parts 
of Ottoman law and terms from the British Mandate for 
Palestine,121 it applied a legal policy that deprived 
Palestinian-Arabs, including the Bedouin, of their 
land.122 Over time, Israel amended or terminated many 
Ottoman and British laws and have enacted new property 
laws that deny Palestinian Arab’s land rights.123 By 
adopting British Article 46 of the Palestine Order in 
Council-1922, which preserved part of Ottoman land 
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law, the State adopted the Ottoman law of the Majallah 
that included the Ottoman land code.124 
On the administrative level, tools, such as 
eviction orders, administrative relocations, service 
deprivation, recognition and urban planning, and zoning, 
provided additional methods for transferring Palestinian-
Arab lands to the State.125 Through planning laws and 
zoning regulations, the State allocated the majority of 
Arab land for Jewish settlement and development needs, 
while preventing or reducing land available for Arab-
Israeli citizens.126 This planning policy affected all Arab 
land dispossessions, but the Bedouin land in the Negev 
was disproportionately affected.127 
In conclusion, the Zionist-Israeli colonial project 
in Palestine was accomplished through a Jewish 
settlement project initiated during Ottoman and then 
continued during British rule; then exacerbated by the 
international community’s partition of Palestine into a 
Jewish State and an Arab State in 1947; and later 
solidified through an Israeli military conquest of much 
of the land designated as an Arab State in 1948. After the 
establishment of the State, like many colonial powers, 
Israel came to rely on its legislative and administrative 
methods of land dispossession. 
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V. THE DISPOSSESSION OF BEDOUIN LAND ON THE 
SPECIFIC LEVEL 
On the local level, Bedouin land in the Negev 
was subject to additional policies of land 
dispossession.128 As mentioned above, the first phase of 
the  Bedouin land dispossession began in the 1930s after 
the Peel Commission proposed a partition plan for 
Palestine that excluded the Negev from the Jewish 
State.129 As a result, Zionist leaders established eleven 
small colonies in the Negev in order to show the land was 
settled by Jews.130 Then in 1946, the Morrison-Grady 
international committee, appointed by the League of 
Nations, recommended a final partition plan that 
partitioned most of the Negev land to the Jewish state.131  
The above-mentioned policies and acts of 
Palestinian land dispossession directly affected the 
Bedouin.132 Mainly, these policies were able to transfer 
most of the Bedouin’s land to the State.133 However, the 
Bedouin continue to possess and own about one and half 
million dunams, about 370,000 acres, in the Negev, an 
area the State considers essential for future settlement 
and development.134 Thus, Israel has been subjecting the 
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Bedouin to additional policies and acts of land 
dispossession that have been specifically designed for 
the Bedouin in the Negev. These policies were executed 
through various methods with the primary methods 
being administrative and legislative policies.135  
 
A. THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAND DISPOSSESSION 
On the administrative level, the state first 
concentrated the Bedouin in a small area; second, it 
forced them to live in small number of towns within a 
designated area; and third, it declared all other Bedouin 
villages as illegal settlements.136  
1. Concentrating the Bedouin in One Place 
After the establishment of Israel, in order to 
secure more land for Jewish settlement, the state 
gathered the remaining Bedouins into a small area called 
the Siyag. 137  Later, in 1956, the state and the military 
institute started discussing the “Bedouin Problem,” 
proposing a variety of possible ways to handle the 
Bedouin in the Negev.138 Interestingly, as Swirski and 
Hasson mention “all of the proposals [the government] 
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considered shared a common denominator – reducing to 
a minimum the area on which the Bedouin would be 
settled in the Siyag region.”139 Minister of Agriculture, 
Moshe Dayan, who aimed to transform the Bedouin into 
an urban proletaria, suggested settling Bedouin in mixed 
Jewish-Arab localities at the center of Israel, along the 
lines of the cities of Jaffa and Ramleh, where they would 
become urban laborers.140 The second proposal, which 
eventually the state adopted,141 suggested concentrating 
the Bedouin in two or three townships within the Siyag 
area in the Negev.142 
The plan to concentrate the Bedouin in smaller 
areas, all within the already contained area of the Siyag, 
was implemented gradually in several stages. In the first 
stage, the state recognized two Bedouin townships and 
required all Bedouin in the surrounding villages to 
relocate to the new townships.143 During that time, Israel 
claimed that the purpose of the act was to modernize 
Bedouin society by putting an end to the Bedouin’s 
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nomadic way of life and provide them with modern 
services.144 
The majority of Bedouins, however, opposed 
leaving their villages, and the state’s efforts to relocate 
the Bedouin failed.145 The Bedouin who refused to leave 
their villages also refused to abandon their way of life 
and disrupt their traditional livelihoods.146 Although 
some state officials claimed that the Bedouin were 
opposed to modernizing their society, in reality, 
according to many commentators, the Bedouin were 
mainly concerned that concentrating themselves in to 
small towns would destroy their culture and their 
traditional economy.147 Since Bedouin economy relies 
heavily on a combination of cultivating land and raising 
livestock, land is essential to maintain their financial 
independence.148 In addition, the Bedouin were also 
concerned that the policy would not only continue to 
discriminate against them in planning and land 
allocation, but also deprive them of their ability to live 
traditionally with their extended families and tribes.149 
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With limited success of the first stage of forced 
sedentarization, the state continued to use every possible 
opportunity to evict Bedouins from their traditional lands 
and settle them into new townships.150 One such 
opportunity appeared with the application of the Israel-
Egypt Peace Treaty.151 In 1979, as part of the Israel-
Egypt Peace Treaty, the state decided to relocate military 
facilities from the Sinai Peninsula (which Israel returned 
to Egypt as part of the treaty) onto the site of a large 
Bedouin community in the Tal-Almalah area.152 As part 
of this move, the state not only confiscated large 
segments of Bedouin land, but it also evicted every 
Bedouin living in the Tal-Almalah area.153 The Bedouin 
were then relocated to two new towns,154 created 
especially for the purpose of resettling the Tal-Almalah 
evacuees.155 This relocation was legalized within Israeli 
law by the Negev Land Acquisition Act (peace treaty 
with Egypt) of 1980.156  
The four existing towns were insufficient 
incentive to drive out the Bedouin from their villages.157 
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Thus, in the third stage, Israel recognized additional 
three Bedouin villages.158 These villages were 
established on Bedouin lands, and although some 
Bedouins were living there already, the state expanded 
the villages into towns and planned for increased 
settlement of Bedouins from surrounding villages and 
rural areas.159 Another time, Israel attempted to 
concentrate the Bedouins in now seven planned towns, 
which was met with very limited success.160  
 Over the next decade, Israel refused to recognize 
or establish additional villages and continued its attempts 
to settle Bedouin from unrecognized villages in the seven 
existing, recognized towns.161 This fourth stage 
consisted of a two-part plan. The first part aimed to evict 
the remaining Bedouin population living in forty-five 
unrecognized villages (about 50% of the whole Bedouin 
population in the Negev) and relocate them to the seven 
recognized townships.162 As part of the state plan to 
force the Bedouin to relocate to the recognized towns, it 
deprived the Bedouin in these villages of basic services, 
such as housing, running water, electricity, education, 
and health services.163 It also applied a tough housing 
demolition policy in order to force the Bedouin to leave 
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their lands and relocate into the designated townships. 164  
The second part of the plan was to re-engage with greater 
intensity with the judicial process of settling Bedouin 
land title claims, which meant creating a legal fiction that 
officially dispossessed most Bedouin of their traditional 
land.165   
In 1996, the Bedouin established the Regional 
Council for the Unrecognized Villages (RCUV), the first 
organization devoted to the rights of those who live in 
the unrecognized villages.166 The RCUV worked with 
human rights non-governmental organizations 
(“NGOs”) to advocate for Bedouin rights, opposing the 
State’s discrimination, oppression, and deprivation 
policies.167 In addition, during the 1990s and early 2000s 
several human rights organizations started raising 
international awareness about the plight of the Bedouin 
of the Negev.168 Eventually, the State realized that it was 
impossible to settle the remaining Bedouin population 
from forty-five villages into the existing seven 
townships.169 As a result, Israel recognized an additional 
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ten villages between 2000 and 2012, creating a total of 
seventeen Bedouin townships.170 
The State also made many changes to disconnect 
the Bedouin physically, economically, and emotionally 
from their land, like evicting Bedouins from their land, 
and preventing agriculture use.171 Such changes 
destroyed the Bedouins’ traditional economy, 
undermined their traditional leadership, and literally 
changed the Bedouins’ landscape by building many 
Jewish towns and other projects on their land.172 The 
State designed these changes to convey to the Bedouin a 
clear message: that restoring the land to the Bedouin is 
not an option. Instead, the only available solution is 
compensation.  
2. Planning and Zoning Policy  
As a part of the concentration plan, the State 
applied a planning and urbanization policy in order to 
prevent Bedouin re-settlement outside the designated 
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Siyag.173 Planning and urbanization policy went hand-in-
hand with the goal of land dispossession.174 This policy 
aimed for placing “the maximum number of [Bedouin] 
on a minimum amount of land and [dispensing] a 
minimum number of Jews on a maximum amount of 
land.”175  One particular part of the State policy would 
transform the Bedouin into an urbanized society of a few 
small towns.176 Moshe Dayan, an Israeli leader and the 
former Israeli Minister of Agriculture, expressed his 
view and even wished to eradicate Bedouin culture 
altogether by settling them in permanent villages and 
transforming them into an urban people.177 In an 
interview with Haaretz newspaper, Dayan stated:   
We should transform the Bedouin into an urban 
proletariat in industry, services, construction, and 
agriculture…Eighty-eight percent of the Israeli 
populations are not farmers; let the Bedouins be like them.  
Indeed, this would be a radical move which means that the 
Bedouin would not live in this land with his herds, but 
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would become an urban person who comes home in the 
afternoon and put his slippers on . . . the children would go 
to school with their hair properly combed.  This would be 
a revolution, but it may be fixed within two generations.  
Without coercion but with government direction. . . this 
phenomenon of the Bedouin will disappear.178 
Planning and zoning laws were influential tools 
to prevent the Bedouin from returning and using their 
land. Especially, the Planning and Building Law of 
1965179 is used to evict many of Bedouin from their land, 
relocate them to townships, and strip them of their 
land.180 The Law authorizes the State to use a speedy 
process of administrative orders to demolish any house 
or building in areas not designated for residential 
housing.181  At the same time, the State designated all 
Bedouin villages as nonresidential areas preventing any 
planning or development in Bedouin villages except the 
recognized townships. 
These acts of dislocation continue to affect 
Bedouin land rights to this day, because they enable the 
State to practice different policies to evict or displace the 
Bedouin from their land. For example, the 2008 
Goldberg Committee, a government committee that was 
formed to address ongoing Bedouin land claims, stated 
in its report that Bedouin who were not in possession of 
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their land (i.e., living on their land or cultivating it) were 
not eligible for any land substitute as part of their 
compensation.182 Instead, the Committee offered those 
Bedouin monetary compensation only, a type of 
compensation the Bedouin have rejected for a long 
time.183  
 The Bedouin who lost possession of their land 
also lost their ability to bargain for land recognition or 
land compensation.184 Significantly, the State law does 
not recognize Bedouin land rights; therefore, Bedouin 
cannot seek any judicial relief through the State judicial 
system; the only way to force the state to compensate 
them is through keeping their ground (i.e., possessing the 
land).185 
Additionally, the plan to concentrate the Bedouin 
in the Siyag zone drastically deteriorated Bedouin living 
conditions. To protect their possession of land, many 
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Bedouins have been compelled to live in their 
unrecognized villages, sacrificing their standard of living 
and their basic rights due to limitations on housing rights, 
employment, and livestock grazing.186 In these villages, 
Israel refuses to provide plans to recognize Bedouin 
villages or provide home building permits, running 
water, electricity, education, or health services. 187  When 
the Bedouin challenge this policy by building homes, the 
State reacts with home demolition orders: it destroys 
every new Bedouin home, files criminal charges, and 
punishes Bedouin with prison time, and heavy fines.188 
3. The Goldberg Committee and its Report: Concentration 
is the Ultimate Plan 
Despite all of the State’s efforts, Israel still found 
many Bedouin unwilling to yield their land.189 In 2007, 
another committee was convened to deal with the 
situation in Bedouin.190 The Goldberg Committee was 
                                                          
 
186 See Ahmad Amara, The Negev Land Question: Between Denial and 
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established for many reasons.191 Some reasons related to 
the Bedouin struggle and their living conditions, while 
other reasons related to Israel’s settlement project and 
policy of land control, including Israel’s plan to transfer 
military facilities from the center of the State, near Tel-
Aviv, to the Negev.192 Additionally, the strengthening 
Bedouin struggle and the growing appearance of 
Bedouin issues in national and international media 
shamed and embarrassed Israel.193 In some cases, the 
visible struggle even changed and impeded Israel’s 
settlement plans.194  
In the past two decades, the Bedouin struggle for 
their rights was notably strengthened.195 Several national 
and international organizations started to work for the 
Bedouin cause and advocate for their rights.196 The 
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193 See U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Comm. on Economic, Social, and 
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195 See Ahmad Amara, Ismael Abu-Saad & Oren Yiftachel, 
Indigenous (In)Justice, HARVARD UNIVERSITY PRESS (2012) 
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Indigenous Peoples’ Land Rights—The Case of Bedouin in Israel, 
AMERICAN UNIVERSITY (2013),  
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organizations began to submit petitions to local courts, 
the Supreme Court, and other tribunals, file reports to 
international bodies, and approach local and 
international media to raise awareness of Bedouin issues, 
including their living conditions, unrecognized villages, 
and land dispossession.197 Human rights organizations 
started to urge Israel to provide basic services to Bedouin 
in the unrecognized villages, such as health services, 
education, infrastructure such as roads, and electricity 
for schools.198 When Israel refused these services, the 
organizations submitted petitions to courts and litigated 
for Bedouin rights.199 In many cases, they succeeded in 
forcing Israel to establish health clinics, build schools, 
pave roads, and provide many other rights and 
services.200 
On the planning and building level, many NGOs, 
along with community leaders, challenged Israel’s 
planning policy.201 Through several Supreme Court 
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petitions, NGOs managed to get decisions that canceled 
the expansion of the master plans of some Jewish towns 
that aimed to annex lands that belonged to Bedouin 
villages.202 In other petitions, NGOs succeeded in 
freezing parts of the National Master Plan that ignored 
the Bedouin villages.203 which ignore the Bedouin 
villages. Further, the organizations were able to get a 
decision that required the National Planning and 
Building Council to amend the Master Plan in a way that 
must take into account the existence of Bedouin villages 
in future planning.204 These achievements forced the 
State to take the Bedouin villages into consideration 
when planning the Beer-Sheva Metropolitan Plan.205 
In January 2008, the Minister of Construction 
and Housing (MOCH) appointed a committee of eight 
members, headed by emeritus Supreme Court Justice 
Eliezer Goldberg.206 However, instead of focusing on the 
Bedouin development problems, the Committee focused 
on additional ways to evict and displace the Bedouin 
from the unrecognized villages to the Bedouin townships 
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and settle their land claims.207 The Bedouins disputed the 
composition of the Goldberg Committee because six of 
the eight members were Jews who represented the 
Israel’s interests.208 Two Bedouin representatives were 
appointed by the minister, but these members were 
affiliated with the government cause rather than Bedouin 
rights.209 Neither of the members came from Bedouin 
NGOs or Bedouin rights groups.210 
The Goldberg Committee issued a report after a 
year-long process of deliberations, during which the 
Committee heard from State officials, representatives 
from local and international organizations, and some 
Bedouins who did not boycott the Committee.211 In 
November 2008, a report was submitted to the Israeli 
Prime Minister that drew up general guidelines and 
recommendations for the government on how to deal 
with Bedouin settlement. 212 Although the report is the 
first official document to recognize the historical 
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injustices imposed upon the Bedouin, the 
recommendations did not meet the minimum 
expectations of the Bedouin community.213  
According to leading human rights 
organizations, the Goldberg Committee failed to 
recognize Bedouin land rights and did not suggest any 
solution.214 Instead, it suggested similar mechanisms and 
methods that had failed in the past.215 The Committee 
even added new methods and mechanisms that further 
discriminate against Bedouin and deprive them of some 
of their compensation rights, namely ownership of 20% 
of their land.216 As for the recognition of Bedouin 
villages, the Committee failed to specify clear 
recommendations.217 Instead, it suggested that only 
villages with a sufficient population in locations that do 
not conflict with other plans could be recognized.218 
Ultimately, the Committee’s report did not suggest any 
major change for the Bedouin problem and did not 
propose any substantial solution for any of the three 
issues in conflict: recognition of Bedouin land, 
recognition of their villages, or demolition of their 
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houses.219 The report was a disappointment in regard to 
Bedouin land rights, recognition of their villages, and 
demolition of their homes. 220 
Furthermore, many Bedouins consider the 
Report to be the major source of their current troubles.221 
It accelerated he process of the Bedouin land 
confiscation, supported the policy of house demolition, 
and encouraged the uprooting their villages.222 Most 
importantly, it established the platform for the Prawer 
Plan, which was used to execute the recommendations of 
the Goldberg Committee.223 These recommendations 
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causes the eviction of the Bedouin from their villages 
and confiscation of their land.224 
4. The Prawer Plan 
Later, in the same year, Israel established another 
team to examine the execution of the committee’s 
recommendations and suggested guidelines for a policy 
on the Bedouin settlement in the new townships, 
including their land claim settlements. 225  The 
government also asked the Committee to provide 
recommendations on policies to regulate the Bedouin 
settlement and provide proposals for new legislation for 
this matter.226 
In 2009, a short time after the Goldberg 
Committee’s Report, the government established the 
Prawer Committee, headed by Ehud Prawer, the former 
deputy chairman of the National Security Council.227 
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The government asked the Committee to prepare a plan 
for the implementation of the Goldberg Committee’s 
recommendations, which include:228 (1) the settlement 
of Bedouin land claims; (2) the planning of new towns 
for Bedouin; and (3) the enforcement of the law in regard 
to the Bedouin illegal house construction (i.e. house 
demolition).229 
In May 2011, the Prawer Committee submitted 
its recommendations in a report known as the Prawer 
Report.230 The Report suggested new compensation 
offers for Bedouin claimants.231 It distinguished the 
compensation of the Bedouin for claims of possessed 
land, land designated as agricultural land, and 
unpossessed land (Bedouin have to give up possession of 
the land, which means they have to evacuate their 
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n.PDF (last visited Sept. 24, 2016). 
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land).232 Regarding only possessed land, the Report 
suggested offering Bedouin claimants parcels of land up 
to 50% of their claimed land as compensation.233 As 
discussed supra, during the last sixty years, Israel 
displaced most of the Bedouin from their land and 
deprived their possession; therefore, the number of 
current landholders is very small.234 For claims 
regarding land not possessed by claimants, which is the 
majority of Bedouin claimants, the Report suggested 
only offering Bedouin monetary compensation.235 This 
means depriving this group of any part of their land as 
compensation.236 
With respect to the issue of planning 
arrangements for Bedouin settlements and recognition of 
Bedouin villages, the Report stated: “solutions for the 
existing population will be in the existing seven 
government-planned townships, in the Abu Basma 
villages (or by expanding the jurisdiction of such 
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villages), and in new settlements.”237 In this regard, the 
Report suggests beginning a process of planning that 
would cover the total Bedouin population in the 
unrecognized villages.238 The process of the settlement 
regulation would include planning expansions for the 
existing towns to absorb the additional Bedouin 
concentrations, and establishing new townships as 
deemed necessary. 239 
With regard to recognition of new Bedouin 
villages, the Report set a high bar of requirements for 
recognition.240 It stated: “[T]he establishment of new 
settlements is contingent upon the ‘criteria of population 
density and continuity’, as well as ‘an examination of 
size and economic capacity.’”241 For years, similar 
criteria have prevented the recognition of Bedouin 
villages.242 The Report also included several other 
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elements like a strict timetable and strict implementation 
of rules to ensure completion.243 Additionally, the 
proposal includes “a plan for the economic development 
and growth of [the] Bedouin population in the 
Negev.”244 
Many human right organizations believe that the 
results of the Prawer Plan would be disastrous for the 
Bedouin if implemented, since the plan suggests the 
eviction of the majority of the Bedouin from their 
villages in the Negev.245 The Report reveals that only 
one-third of the Bedouin of the unrecognized villages 
will remain in their current places, while two-thirds will 
be uprooted from their villages and resettled in other 
Bedouin towns.246 The Report proposed to displace 
nearly 20,000 to 30,000 Bedouins from their villages and 
transfer them to other Bedouin towns such as Rahat, 
Kseifa, and Hura.247 Many villages such as Assir, 
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Alssera, and Um Alhiran—with respective populations 
of 1500, 1000, and 500—would be demolished.248  
Additionally, the plan suggested implementing a 
new segregation protocol in the Negev.249 It arranges for 
Bedouin settlements within a clearly demarcated and 
separate region in the Negev; it separates the Bedouin 
population from the rest of the State’s population. 250F250 
After the Report’s publication, many right wing 
political parties protested against the plan.251 They 
claimed that the government was giving out the Negev 
to the Bedouin.252 As a result of the amounting pressure 
from these right wing political groups, Prime Minister 
Benjamin Netanyahu ordered the National Security 
Advisor, Jacob Amidror, to review the Report.253 
Accordingly, Amidror reviewed the plans and made 
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several amendments that affect the location of the 
resettlement, land ownership claims, and the amount of 
compensation.254 Amidror’s amendments further 
decreased the area designated for the Bedouin 
settlement.255 He state “no land [compensation] will be 
given to Bedouin and no Bedouin settlement will be 
planned west of Highway 40.”256 
In addition, Amidror’s amendments decreased 
the amount of land the Bedouin were supposed to receive 
as part of their compensation as claimants.257 The 
amendment specifies that the proposed arrangement 
would only apply to Bedouin who filed a lawsuit prior to 
October 1979, and whose claims were not rejected by the 
Land Settlement Officer or the court.258  Another 
amendment provides that the proposed arrangement will 
apply only to land, which the Bedouins held and 
cultivated, rather than claims for grazing lands, which 
constitute most of the claimed land.259 Further, the 
amendments held that the determination of land area for 
purposes of providing compensation shall be made 
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according to evidence of cultivation of the land, or living 
on the land close to the time of filing the original claim, 
provided that the land was not held at that time or in the 
future by the State.260 
Bedouin, who earlier objected to the Prawer Plan, 
claimed that Amidror’s amendments made the proposal 
totally unacceptable, mainly because the amendments 
dramatically reduced the land Bedouin could get in 
compensation as part of the land settlement.261 The 
original Prawer Plan proposed an area of 45,220 acres 
(183,000 dunams) for Bedouin living in the 
unrecognized villages in exchange for settlement of their 
land claims, but after the amendments, the area was 
reduced by almost half.262  
In summary, the Prawer Plan outlines 
implementation of the Goldberg Commission Report to 
deal with the Bedouin settlement issue in the 
unrecognized villages, rather than recognizing their 
villages. The Plan was prepared without any consultation 
with Bedouins of the unrecognized villages, and it could 
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lead to the uprooting of tens of thousands of Bedouin 
from their homes.263 
5. The Legislative Method of Land Dispossession and the 
Ordinance Regime 
On the legislative level, after the establishment of 
Israel, it was less acceptable than it had been during the 
War, but also illegal, to evict the Bedouin, who became 
citizens of the State from their villages.264 Therefore, the 
State began using another, less aggressive, and more 
politically acceptable means to evict the Bedouin from 
their lands: the law. Thus, the State started relying more 
on legislation in order to continue to the “wholesale 
takeover” of Bedouin lands.265 Legislation not only 
enabled the dispossession of Bedouin land but also 
legitimized the dispossession in legal terms and in eyes 
of many Israeli citizens and international community. 266. 
These legislations can be divided into two groups. The 
first group were national/general laws, which applied to 
all the Arabs in Israel, facilitated the dispossession of 
Bedouin land as part of the general policy of Arab lands 
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dispossession.267 These laws include the Absentee 
Property Law (1950) and the Land Acquisition Law 
(1953).268 The second group of laws, which this Article 
focuses on, specifically focused on Bedouin land 
dispossession, including: The Land Rights Settlement 
Ordinance (1969), the Negev Land Acquisition Act 
(Peace Treaty with Egypt) of 1980 (The Peace Law), and 
the Public Land Law (Trespasser Eviction) of 1981 
(Amendment 2005).269   
This second group of laws, especially Land 
Rights Settlement Ordinance (1969), “created the 
‘alleged’ mechanism and framework for the 
investigation for Bedouin land rights,”270 which resulted 
in the dispossession of most of their land, and continue 
to serve for such purpose.271 
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http://www.academia.edu/235048/The_Battle_for_the_Land_and_Housin
g_Rights_of_the_ Negev_Bedouin.   
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B. LAND RIGHTS SETTLEMENT ORDINANCE OF 1969 
The Land Rights Settlement Ordinance (1969) is 
the first major legislation that disproportionately 
impacted Bedouin land rights.272 During the late 1970s, 
as part of Israel’s policy of land registration, the State 
legislated the Ordinance to register and determine the 
ownership of land in Israel.273  As part of this procedure, 
Israel initiated a process for settling all Bedouin land 
claims. 274  
The Bedouins filed 3,220 land-title settlement 
lawsuits asking the State to recognize their land 
ownership for about 245,000 acres of land.275 Many 
Bedouin, however, were excluded from this process.  
The Alazazimah tribes, for example, who owned about 
55,500 acres, located in Sahl-Albagar (Har-Hanegev 
region), were prevented from filing land settlement 
claims due to the fact that the State had previously 
expropriated their land for military needs.276 In this lone 
step, the State dispossessed about 20% of Bedouin 
                                                          
 
272 See AMARA, supra note 195. 
273 See Havatzelet Yahel, Land Disputes Between the Negev Bedouin 
and Israel, 11 ISR. STUD. 1–22, 11 (2006). 
274 See Porat, supra note 46 at 457; PORAT, supra note 77 at 19.  
275 See SWIRSKI AND HASSON, supra note 136 at 19.  
276 See Yiftachel, supra note 4. 
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land.277 Thus, as several scholars indicate the Bedouin 
land claims reached as many as 300,000 acres.278  
Surprisingly, all of the 3,220 Bedouin land 
settlement claims were rejected by the Land Settlement 
Officer.279 Therefore, per the Ordinance requirement, the 
Settlement Officer forwarded all Bedouin lawsuits to the 
District Court for final judgment.280 The Settlement 
Officer claimed that the Bedouin do not possess the 
required documents, namely British or Ottoman title 
deeds to prove their land ownership.281 The Land 
Settlement Officer refused to accept the Bedouin’s 
traditional documentation, such as contracts for land 
                                                          
 
277 See Dan Rabinowitz & Sliman Khawalde, Demilitarized, then 
Dispossessed: The Kirad Bedouins of the Hula Valley in the Context of 
Syrian-Israeli Relations, 32 INT’L J. OF MIDDLE EAST STUD., 511, (2000) 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/259423. 
278 See Ronen Shamir, Suspended in Space: Bedouins Under the Law 
of Israel, 30 LAW SOC. REV. 231–257, 244, 250 (1996). 
279 See Suhad Bishara, Adalah’s Position Paper on “Prawer II”, THE 
LEGAL CENTER FOR ARAB MINORITY RIGHTS IN ISRAEL (Jan. 2017), 
https://www.adalah.org/uploads/uploads/Adalah_Position_Paper_Prawer_
II_23.1.2017.pdf. 
280 See LAND RIGHTS SETTLEMENT ORDINANCE [REVISED] 5729, 
(1969), https://www.nevo.co.il/law_html/Law01/286_031.htm (last visited 
Aug 25, 2018) (according to article 43 of the Ordinance when the Land 
Settlement Officer decides to dismiss a land settlement claim he has to 
forward it for the District Court, for a final decision). 
281 See Land and Housing Rights Violations in Israel’s Unrecognized 
Bedouin Villages, OFF THE MAP, 
https://www.hrw.org/report/2008/03/30/map/land-and-housing-rights-
violations-israels-unrecognized-bedouin-villages (last visited Mar. 23, 
2019). 
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purchase (Sanadat) and other evidence as sufficient 
proof of their land rights.282  
When Bedouin reached the District Court, as part 
of their appeal, it as well, rejected their lawsuits and 
refused to recognize any of their land rights, thus they 
appealed to the High Court. 283 The High Court also 
rejected their land claims and ordered the land to be 
registered under the name of the State.284 In the 
precedential case of the Alhawashelah v. State of Israel, 
the High Court rejected the appeal and decided that 
Bedouin land was Mawat land,285 and thus ruled that 
Bedouin lands were to be registered as State land, 
indicating that the Bedouin had no legal right to the 
land.286 Since Alhawashelah is case precedent, all courts 
have rejected all subsequent Bedouin land claims.287 To 
this day, no court has ruled in favor of Bedouin claimants 
for a single land-claim lawsuit.288  
                                                          
 
282 See Elsana, supra note 196. 
283 Id. at 56. 
284 See id. 
285 See CA 218/74 Salim El-Huashlla v. State of Israel (Alhawashelah) 
38(3) PD 141 (1974) (Isr.).  
286 See HCJ 84/83 El-Wakili v. State of Israel 37(4) PD 173 (1983) 
(Isr.).  
287 See Ron Kelley, Israel's Bedouin: The End of Poetry, AM. FOR 
MIDDLE EAST UNDERSTANDING (AMEU) 3 (1998) (“To date, no Bedouin 
has ever won a land claim. This includes some 3,000 lawsuits by the 
Bedouin over the past two decades.”).  
288 See Palestinian Bedouin IDPs, Ongoing Displacement and Land 
Rights: Israel Poisons Bedouin Land in Abda Unrecognized Villages, AL 
MAJDAL 37 (2003) (reporting that no Bedouin has ever won a land claim to 
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1. The Ordinance Regime: The Effect of Legislation 
Indeed, the laws that Israel passed created a new 
regime for Bedouin land dispossession, but among the 
many laws, the Land Rights Settlement Ordinance is 
particularly notable. 289 The Ordinance eliminates the 
previous land regime, introduces a new regime that 
regulates Bedouin land, and effectively ensures Bedouin 
land dispossession.290 Instead of settlement and land title 
registration, the Ordinance initiated a new process that 
established the basic legal elements that ensured the 
long-term dispossession of Bedouin lands.291 Through 
sophisticated and extraordinary steps, the Ordinance 
established new rules for land settlement claims, 
determined the jurisdiction of courts, and articulated the 
applicable law for the land settlement process.292  
The administrative and legal steps that the 
Ordinance requires for Bedouin land claims is 
challenging for most Bedouin. 293 It requires them to 
submit a “land title settlement claim” to the Land Rights 
                                                          
 
any of the more than 3000 lawsuits filed over 50 years, and this places the 
burden of proof regarding Bedouin land claims on Bedouin). 
289 See DAVID KRETZMER, THE LEGAL STATUS OF THE ARABS IN ISRAEL 
(1990). 
290 See Elsana, supra note 196. 
291 See id.  
292See id. (It started by describing the process, defining the settlement 
areas, and drafting the orders and notices for the towns). 
293 See Land Rights Settlement Ordinance (Revised), 5729- 1969, 13 
OSI 293, 293, Art. 17 (Isr.). 
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Settlement Officer (part of the Ministry of Justice).294 
Then, the Land Settlement Officer investigates and 
assesses the claims.295 If the Officer approves the claim, 
he registers the land in the name of the Bedouin 
claimant.296 However, when the Officer rejects the 
lawsuit, he declares it a disputed claim and transfers the 
case to the District Court for a final judgment.297 
According to the Ordinance, only the Court is authorized 
to settle disputes concerning land rights and to make 
final decisions that dismiss their land claim.298 Article 
17(a) of the Ordinance states: “[u]pon publishing a 
settlement notification in a town, every person who 
claims land rights shall appear [in court]. . . and submit 
his memorandum of claim in the prescribed form.”299 
Articles 43 and 44 of the Ordinance determine both the 
appropriate court jurisdiction and the applicable law to 
be applied where there is a dispute between claimants.300  
Relying on the claim that the Bedouin do not hold 
any land rights, the Ordinance requires Bedouins to go 
                                                          
 
294 Id.  
295 See id. at Art. 22. 
296 See id.  
297 See id. at Art. 53. 
298 See id. at Art. 43 (“The court only is authorized to hear and 
adjudicate any dispute about land in a settlement area, and if there were 
conflicting claims between two or more plaintiffs, the settlement officer 
shall transfer the dispute to court.”)  
299 Id. at Art. 17(a). 
300 See id. at Art. 43, 44 (Article 43 of the Ordinance provides that only 
courts shall have jurisdiction over disputes regarding land settlement, and if 
there are any conflicting claims between two or more claimants, the Land 
Settlement Officer shall transfer the dispute to court). 
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through a legal process to prove their rights.301 The 
Ordinance disregards Bedouin traditional land rights and 
sets the platform for the policy of land dispossession in 
the Negev.302 The Ordinance ignores customary law or 
land rights based on international customary law.303 
The Ordinance establishes a set of rules that 
ensure the supremacy of the State and the inferiority of 
Bedouin legal rights.304 It supports Israel’s legal position 
and undermines the Bedouin’s position.305 Specifically, 
Article 135 of the Ordinance “classifies all [M]awat 
lands as State property, unless formal legal title could be 
produced.”306 Since the State classifies Bedouin land as 
Mawat land, it essentially classifies, or considers 
Bedouin land as State property.307 Such articles give a 
clear privilege to the State over Bedouin claimants and 
facilitate the expropriation of their land by legal 
means.308  
Further, the Ordinance preserves the State’s right 
to object to any Bedouin claim without requiring that the 
                                                          
 
301 See Elsana, supra note 196, at 58.  
302 See id. 
303 See Land Rights Settlement Ordinance, supra note 293.  
304 See Elsana, supra note 196, at 58. 
305 See id.  
306 Tawfiq S. Rangwala, Inadequate Housing, Israel, and the Bedouin 
of the Negev, 42 OSGOODE HALL LAW J. 415, 440–41 (2004). 
307 See PLIA ALBECK, DOAH MESAKEM SHEL TZEVET HAMOMHIM LEANYAN 
HESDER MEKARKIEN EZOR HASYAG HANGEV HTSFONI [REPORT OF THE TEAM OF 
EXPERTS ON THE ISSUE OF LAND SETTLEMENT IN THE SIYAG AREA AND THE 
NORTHERN NEGEV], ISR. MINISTRY OF JUST. (Oct. 20, 1975). 
308 See Elsana, supra note 196, at 58. 
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State prove any rights or connection to the Bedouin 
land.309 Article 22 of the Ordinance adds “[t]he State’s 
rights in land shall be investigated and will be settled 
whether officially sued or not, all rights in land that have 
not been proven by other claims shall be registered in the 
name of the State.”310 In addition, Article 53 grants the 
State the ultimate right to object to the settlement of title 
claims.311 The Article states:  
[i]f an objection was filed in one of the matters 
mentioned in Articles 51 and 52, the Settlement Officer 
shall transfer the matter to the court, and the court may 
order the registration of the possessor as the owner of the 
land, if it finds that the mentioned conditions were met.312 
In traditional legal procedure, the party who 
claims rights against the possessor generally submits the 
claim, serves as the plaintiff, and proves his claim.313 
The new order, however, reverses the traditional rule. 314 
Instead of asking the state (to submit a claim and prove 
it) it requires the Bedouin—who possess the land—to 
submit the claim, serve as the plaintiff, and carry the 
burden of proof.315 
                                                          
 
309 See id. at 59.  
310 See Land Rights Settlement Ordinance, supra note 293. 
311 See id. at Art. 53.  
312 Id.  
313 See Elsana, supra note 4, 354-57 (Oct. 2017).  
314 See id.  
315 See id. at 351.  
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According to Article 43 of the Ordinance, for 
either side to be able to own the land, both the Bedouin 
and the State must prove their rights.316 Under Article 45 
of the Ordinance, when neither the Bedouin nor the State 
agrees to serve as plaintiff, the court decides which side 
should be the plaintiff and subsequently bear the burden 
of proof.317  In Bedouin land cases, however, the 
Ordinance changes the traditional order and demands the 
Bedouin plaintiffs to submit lawsuits for land 
settlement.318 Then, the State then summons the Bedouin 
to court and, once again, forces them to serve as plaintiff 
and carry the burden of proof.319 
The Ordinance also transforms the status of the 
Bedouin people from “owners of land,” or “possessors 
of land,” to “claimants of land,” or “claimants for land 
rights.”320 This transformation has a tremendous effect 
on Bedouin land adjudication in courts, which results in 
a long, complicated legal process that denies Bedouin 
                                                          
 
316 See Land Rights Settlement Ordinance, supra note 293 at Art. 43. 
317 See id. at Art. 45.  
318 See id. at Art 43 (The Bedouin must defend their land in court. If 
they do not appear in court, they automatically lose their claims and their 
land).  
319 Many Bedouins were surprised to find that when they came to 
defend their land they were summoned to court as plaintiffs rather than 
defendants. Some Bedouins did not know about the claims their parents had 
submitted filed in the land registry long time before legal action had been 
taken by the State.  
320 See Land Rights Settlement Ordinance, supra note 293 at Art. 
17(a). 
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land rights.321 The process requires Bedouins who appeal 
for land ownership to prove their rights, while those who 
agree to accept compensation are not required to do 
so.322 In other words, the process denies the recognition 
of land rights for those who insist on asking courts to 
recognize their land ownership, while at the same time, 
recognizes land ownership for those who agree to sell 
their land to the State.  In latter cases, the State 
recognizes Bedouin rights mainly based on their 
traditional law.323 The State’s “acceptable paradox” does 
not find any representation in the legal process.324 Such 
changes contradict basic rules of due process and law of 
evidence (rules of evidence), delay adjudication, and 
prevent Bedouins from effectively bringing forth 
evidence to prove their claims. 
A careful analysis of the situation on a macro 
level reveals that the State, rather than the Bedouin, 
deserves to serve as the plaintiff. The State is the party 
that acts and behaves as the plaintiff in the general 
adjudicatory process. The State is the one interested in 
obtaining or acquiring rights through the legal process; 
It claims rights against the Bedouin who is in possession 
                                                          
 
321 Compare Joseph William Singer, Nine-Tenths of the Law: Title, 
Possession & Sacred Obligations, 38 CONN. L. REV. 605 (2006) (explaining 
the land settlement dispute between the Onieda Indian Nation and New 
York’s non-Indian citizens). 
322 See Land Rights Settlement Ordinance, supra note 293 at Art. 43. 
323 See Morad Elsana, The Recognition of Indigenous Peoples' Land: 
Application of the Customary Land Rights Model on the Arab-Bedouin Case 
in Israel, 7 GEO. J. L. & MOD. CRIT. RACE. PERSP. 45, 61 (2015). 
324 See Elsana, supra note 196. 
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of the land.325  The State claims rights, summons 
Bedouins to court, and controls the legal process, while 
the Bedouin (defined as the plaintiff) behave as 
defendants and attempt to defend their rights in court. 
Also, in the land settlements process, the State is the 
party who initiates the legal process and forces the 
Bedouin to file their claims. In the 1970s the State forced 
the Bedouin to file land title settlement claims; in 2003, 
the State filed counterclaims and forced the Bedouin to 
adjudicate their land settlement claims in court.326 
Therefore, the State, rather than the Bedouin, should 
serve as the plaintiff and carry the burden of proof. 
Israel’s control of the legal process is another 
factor that should be taken into consideration. The State 
decides when to start the process, when to freeze it, and 
against which tribe or tribes to submit claims. The State 
controls many important elements of the process such as 
the time passed, and the statutes of limitation. Only 
through colonial “legal magic” does the impossible 
become possible against indigenous peoples.327 The 
timing of such acts proves to have a tremendous effect 
on the Bedouin claims, since it defines and controls the 
ability of the Bedouin to provide evidence and call 
witnesses to court. These limitations eventually lead to 
the Bedouin’s inability to prove their cases.  
                                                          
 
325 See generally Kent McNeil, The Onus of Proof of Aboriginal Title, 
37 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 775, 776 (1999). 
326 See Morad Elsana, The Role of the Judiciary in Dispossessing 
Indigenous Peoples’, AM J. JURIS. 333, 350-51 (2018). 
327 See Elsana, supra note 323 at 61. 
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One blatant example of how the State 
undermines the Bedouin position can be found in Israel’s 
ability to delay adjudication of Bedouin land claims for 
a long time. The State has kept Bedouin claims pending 
for about forty years after the Land Settlement Process 
began in the early 1970s. That delay is one of the 
elements that severely undermined the Bedouin’s ability 
to bring evidence, especially witnesses, to the court, 
particularly because of the Bedouin oral culture328 
During the delay, many Bedouin claimants lost the 
ability to prove their land rights due to the death of many 
claimants and witnesses to traditional, pre-State life.329 
Much of the major evidence was lost with them.330 This 
is significant because the Court requires evidence from 
1921, the year of the British Mawat Ordinance, or before 
to be available.331 Further, the Ordinance places the 
ultimate power to adjudicate Bedouin land in the hands 
of the State.332 The State then abuses that power by 
managing and manipulating the process in order to 
weaken the Bedouins’ legal position and undermine their 
ability to prove their land rights. 
Finally, one must notice that Article 44 of the 
Ordinance outlines the substantive law courts should 
apply when evaluating a land settlement claim, provides 
that: (a) A court shall judge by land laws that are in effect 
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during the trial, and take into an account the rights of 
real estate by law and by equity.333 However, despite 
this, the state and courts have ignored such options and 
insists the Bedouin have no land rights.334 
 
2.  The Bedouins’ Limited Understanding of the Land Title 
Settlement Process 
Bedouins’ limited understanding of Israel’s legal 
system and of the Hebrew language are other factors that 
limit their ability to advocate their land rights, and 
indirectly facilitate confiscation of their land.335 Land 
title settlement was an unfamiliar process for the 
Bedouin;  many of them did not really understand the 
process, its goals, or the documents they received from 
the Land Registrar Officer, such as application forms for 
land claims.336 Many mistakenly thought that the State 
wanted to register their land in the Land Registry to 
recognize their ownership.337 During the process of 
submitting the land title settlement applications, the 
Bedouin were required to provide evidence of their land 
rights, which they did in the form of Sanadat or 
witnesses’ statements.338 They also had to define the 
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borders and the size of their land.339 At the end of each 
application for land title settlement, they received 
official documents signed by the State Officer of the 
Land Registration Office, under the Ministry of Justice, 
acknowledging receipt of those documents, but not 
confirming land ownership.340 However, many Bedouins 
were illiterate and could not read the content of the 
documents they received.341 To this day, some Bedouins 
mistakenly think that the application forms or the 
confirmation of their traditional documents, that they 
receive from the Land Settlement Officer, are Israeli title 
deeds for their land.342 Therefore, many Bedouin 
mistakenly refer to the documents as title deeds or 
official documents that prove their land ownership.343 
In addition, during the late 1970s, when Israel 
started the land settlement process, the Bedouin did not 
trust the new State, especially in issues related to their 
land.344 In the beginning, many of them refused to 
submit land settlements claims through this process.345 
The State, only after making extraordinary efforts, was 
able to convince the Bedouins to submit settlement 
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claims.346 The State also sent officers to tribal leaders to 
convince them to submit claims on behalf of their 
tribes347. Furthermore, when such efforts did not suffice, 
the State warned the Bedouins about the consequences 
of not submitting claims.348 
3. The Government Committee and the Mawat Land 
Doctrine  
In 1975, Israel appointed a special committee to 
inquire into the legal status of Bedouin land rights 
(which became known as the Albeck Committee).349 In 
October the same year, the Committee issued its report 
about Bedouin land rights.350 The report stated three 
main points: first, all lands of the Negev (Siyag area) are 
Mawat lands because when the Ottoman Lands Code of 
1858 was published, there was no permanent settlement 
in the Negev; second, no Bedouin can acquire any land 
                                                          
 
346See Farah Mihlar, Israel's Denial of the Bedouin. BRIEFING 
LONDON: MINORITY RIGHTS GROUP INT’L. 1, 8 (2011). 
347 See Aron Medzini, Bedouin Settlement Policy in Israel: Success or 
Failure? HORIZONS GEOGRAPHY 79/80, 37, 39 (2012).  
348 See LAWS OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL ORDINANCE ART. 5(B)(2) (a 
warning of the expected results to a person who does not file his claim at 
the required time, and will not delimit the plot he is claiming and the 
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349 See Ahmad Amara, The Goldberg Committee: Legal and Extra-
legal Means to Solving the Naqab Bedouins Case, HAGAR STUDIES IN 
CULTURE POLITY AND IDENTITIES 8 (2): 227, 229 (2008), 
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/269141091_The_Goldberg_Com
mittee_Legal_and_extra-
legal_means_of_solving_the_Naqab_Bedouin_case. 
350 See id. 
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rights, even under possession and continuous cultivation; 
third, all Bedouin land is State land.351 
The report further established the principles of 
the policy applicable to Bedouin land to this day, 
particularly the non-recognition of Bedouin land 
ownership.352 As a result of  the Committee’s 
recommendations, the State did not bring any further 
Bedouin land claim lawsuits to be adjudicated in courts 
until 2003.353 Instead, “[t]he State started to push the 
Bedouin to relinquish their lands by offering them 
compensation and convincing them to settle their land 
claims through different methods of pressure and 
negotiations.”354 
4. Halt on Bedouin Land Settlement 1984-2003 and The 
Negev Plan of 2003  
Between 1984 and 2003, Israel continued to 
refuse to recognize the Bedouin land rights and 
continued to expropriate their land when the Bedouin 
refused to accept the State’s offers for land settlement.355 
Meanwhile, the majority of Bedouin refused to either 
relinquish their lands or settle their land lawsuits.356 
Some Bedouin refused as a matter of principle and others 
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refused due to inadequate offers of compensation.357 As 
a result, this situation became a deadlock, with no 
solution that both the Bedouin and State could accept. 
Israel started to claim that the halt in the land rights 
settlement process was impeding the development of the 
Negev.358 This created another excuse for the State to 
continue to promote more aggressive plans and policies 
to end the Bedouin land issue; specifically, the State 
pursued adjudicating the Bedouin long-time pending 
land settlement lawsuits (completion of the land title 
settlement process), obtained favorable decisions in 
courts, and disposed the Bedouin land.359 
For many years, Israel claimed the Bedouin land 
issue was the main obstacle for the development of the 
Negev.360 In fact, State officials and political leaders 
continue to promote the idea that Bedouin land claims 
are the main reason behind their refusal to leave their 
land and move to settle in the new townships.361 The 
State started to claim in the media that solving or 
eliminating the land settlement issues is the only way to 
develop the Negev.362  
                                                          
 
357 See Havatzelet Yahel, Land Disputes Between the Negev Bedouin 
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In 2003, the government decided to confront the 
Bedouin issue through the Negev Plan of 2003.363 
According to the government, the plan aimed to improve 
services and infrastructure in the recognized townships 
and to guard the State’s land in the Negev against 
Bedouin trespassing or theft.364 In practice, the plan 
sought to relocate Bedouin from their villages into 
designated townships and settle Bedouin land claims.365   
Bedouin were also concerned that their land 
would be taken from them to serve Jewish development 
needs and settlement programs in the Negev, rather than 
to serve their own urgent development needs, that have 
been ignored for more than sixty years, as it did in Umm 
al-Hiran Village, and Azzarnouge.366 Bedouin claimed 
that the main goal of the plan is to evict them from their 
land, concentrate them in large towns, and dispossess 
them of their land.367 Therefore, the Bedouin opposed 
                                                          
 
363 See SWIRSKI AND HASSON, supra note 136 at 12. 
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the Bedouin boycott of the Goldberg Committee). 
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the plan, refused to cooperate, and advocated against the 
plan.368 
C. COUNTERCLAIMS: THE ENDLESS EFFECT OF THE 
ORDINANCE  
In 2004, as part of the Negev Plan—in a step 
designed to put additional pressure on Bedouin to coerce 
them to settle their land claims—the State renewed the 
adjudication of Bedouin land claims in courts and started 
to submit mass counterclaim lawsuits against 
Bedouin.369 Israel vowed to adjudicate all Bedouin land 
claims and settle the Bedouin land issue.370 To make the 
plan more effective and assertive Israel allocated special 
budgets, and hired a special team of lawyers and experts 
to complete the task as soon as possible.371 
These counterclaims compel the Bedouin to 
either settle their land claims or appear in court for 
adjudication.372 If claimants do not appear in court to 
adjudicate their claims, the court would dismiss their 
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claim and confiscate the land.373 The government also 
raised the compensation offer, for a limited time of three 
years, in order to speed up the process, and increased the 
land component compensation from 20% to 30%.374 At 
the same time, it warned that those who refuse to settle 
their land claims would be deprived of both their land 
and compensation.375   
The results have been devastating for Bedouin 
land rights. Shortly after 2004, the State brought more 
than 130 counter-claims to Bedouin land claims; the 
State won forty cases, relating to about 6177 acres 
(25,000 dunams) that were registered in the name of the 
State.376 As of April 2016, Bedouins have lost every land 
case that has come to trial.377  In an effort to extinguish 
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the Bedouin land issue, the State summons Bedouin 
claimants to the Land Settlement Office one by one, or 
tribe by tribe, to settle Bedouin land claims.378  
D. NEGEV LAND ACQUISITION (PEACE TREATY) 1980 
Israel also utilized Negev Land Acquisition 
legislation to dispossess Bedouin land. In 1979, the State 
signed the Camp David Peace Agreement with Egypt.379 
According to the agreement, Israel agreed to withdraw 
from the Sinai Peninsula and remove its military bases 
from Egypt.380 Rather than selecting alternative 
available places in the Negev, Israel decided to relocate 
the military airport and the military bases on Bedouin 
land in the Tal-Almalah region, where a major 
concentration of Bedouin tribes and lands are located.381 
In order to avoid legal intervention by Bedouin 
or human rights groups, Israel passed the Negev Land 
Acquisition Law of 1980, known as the Peace Treaty 
with Egypt (“Peace Treaty Law”).382 The Peace Treaty 
Law imposed Bedouin eviction and land dispossession, 
and established the compensation process by law.383 This 
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law allowed the State to evict all Bedouin people in the 
Tal-Almalah area and exile them to the designated 
townships of Arara and Ksyefeh.384 It also allowed the 
State to confiscate their land in exchange for small 
amounts of compensation, with a price fixed by law.385 
Although it was designed specifically for the Tal-
Almalah region, the State applied the Peace Treaty Law 
to all Bedouin land settlement matters, especially to 
matters regarding land compensation.386 Today, the law 
defines both the monetary and land components of 
compensation.387 
The Peace Treaty Law not only physically 
dispossessed Bedouins of their land, but also subjected 
them to inadequate and discriminatory compensation 
rules. Compensation paid to other settlers highlights 
inequity: the State paid Jewish settlers evacuated from 
the Negev in the same year more than ten times the 
amount paid to the dislocated Bedouin.388 Twenty-four 
years later, when the State evicted Bedouin and Jewish 
residents from Gaza Strip, compensation reflected a 
comparable disparity. 389 Following the 1980 Peace 
                                                          
 
384 See id. 
385 See id.  
386 See Amara, supra note 78, at 77. 
387 See id. 
388 See Elezer Goldberg, HAVADA LEHATSAAT MDINIOT LEHASDARAT 
HITYASHVUT HABEDOUIM BANEGEV [PROTOCOL OF GOLDBERG COMMITTEE], 
MINISTRY OF CONSTRUCTION & HOUSING 75 (May 6, 2008). 
389 See Ezra Hezikia, The Evacuees Act Passed Third Reading, ARUTZ 
SHEVA (Aug. 4, 2011) http://www.inn.co.il/News/News.aspx/223902.  
 SOUTH CAROLINA JOURNAL OF 
74 INTERNATIONAL LAW AND BUSINESS VOL. 15.2 
 
 
 
Agreement, the State worked to confiscate as much 
Bedouin land as possible with these inequitable 
compensation terms.390 
E. PUBLIC LAND ACT (REMOVAL OF SQUATTERS) OF 
2005 
In 2005, the government enacted additional 
legislation aimed to further dispossess Bedouin land. 
The law, part of an amendment to the Public Land Act, 
gives local authorities the power to issue orders for the 
removal of squatters from public land without judicial 
review, a previously mandatory step.391  The obvious 
purpose of the Act is to prevent Bedouins from using 
their traditional land—which the State defines as public 
land—and to evict them quickly if they do use it.392 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Through administrative activities and various 
legislation, Israel established a system that dispossesses 
Bedouin land393 and targets Bedouin land rights on 
multiple levels.394 Such laws not only facilitate Bedouin 
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land dispossession, but also enable and legitimize land 
dispossession by the executive and judiciary branches.395  
The case of Bedouin land dispossession mirrors 
the systematic dispossession of indigenous peoples by 
colonial powers, who employed methods of invasion, 
occupation, removal, concentration, denial of land 
rights, legislation initiatives, and strategic policies, to 
dispossess land.396 Additionally, the Israeli State, also 
made many physical changes to the Bedouin landscape, 
further disconnecting the Bedouins physically, 
economically, and emotionally from their land.397 Such 
changes destroyed the Bedouins’ traditional economy,398 
undermined their traditional leadership, and literally 
changed the Bedouins’ landscape by building towns and 
projects on their land.399 These changes were designed 
to convince the Bedouins that restoring the land to the 
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Bedouins is not an option,400 and that the only available 
solution to Bedouin land claims is through financial 
compensation.401 This is created a psychology that keeps 
pushing many Bedouins toward settling their land rights 
and giving up their longtime struggle. 
The most important consideration is the way 
Israel’s actions and legislations were able to manipulate 
legal rights and eliminate the Bedouins ability to 
advocate for their land.402 The State changed procedures, 
changed the burden of proof, delayed the adjudication 
process until witnesses died, and ignored a substantial 
law that could recognize Bedouin rights under the 
principle of equity.403 In addition, Bedouin professional 
and economic disadvantages, coupled with linguistic 
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obstacles, are eliminating Bedouin chances to win in 
courts.404 
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